In S e a r c h of Identity: An Autobiography Anwar el-Sadat (Rev. ed. 1992) Translated by: Jack L. Rives, Lt Colonel, USAF Seminar H (Amb Newton) National War College September 18, 1992 NATIONAL n : ~ ~.: ~:.,.,~" ~.,.,' ~.:.: U N I V E R S I T Y LI~JRAR¥ SPECIAL COLLECTIONS Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2. REPORT TYPE 18 SEP 1992 18-09-1992 to 18-09-1992 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER In Search of Identity: An Autobiography 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 10 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 But to come to those who have become princes through their own merits and not by f o r t u n e . . , it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into what form they thought fit; and without that opportunity their powers would have been wasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in vain. - Machiavelli The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man. - George Bernard Shaw Either lead, follow, or get out of the way. - Popular Bumper-Sticker Translator's Disclaimer and Note on Sources Following is an "excerpt" of the "1992 revised edition" of Anwar el-Sadat's In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. The material is based on the seminar readings: excerpts from the 1977 (original) edition of Sadat's book; Bard E. O'Neill, "The October War: A Political-Military Assessment," Air University Review, 25 (JulyAugust 1974): 27-35; and Henry Kissinger, "Why We Were Surprised" from Chapter 11 in Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 459-461, 465-467. 9 The October War I r e c a l l one starry e v e n i n g w e l l over a y e a r b e f o r e t h e O c t o b e r War, w h e n I r e f l e c t e d on the c o n d i t i o n s We w e r e a p o o r country, f a c i n g m y people. but worse, we w e r e v e r y d e m o r a l i z e d . g a z e d to the n o r t h e a s t for both the cause and the p o s s i b l e There lay Israel, sea. She, the state we had long v o w e d to d r i v e however, h e r w a r s a g a i n s t us, was the p r o u d victor: cure. into the as a c u l m i n a t i o n of she now stood upon our lands in t h e Sinai. Her o c c u p a t i o n cost us e c o n o m i c a l l y ; threat; I it was an o b v i o u s security and e v e r y day it p r o v i d e d a t a u n t i n g a f f r o n t to our n a t i o n a l pride. The I s r a e l i s b e l i e v e d t e r r i t o r y p r o v i d e d safety and t h e y w e r e u n w i l l i n g to enter m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s . N e i t h e r our A r a b b r o t h e r s nor the w o r l d at large p r o v i d e d s u p p o r t to us. an u n r e l i a b l e My t h o u g h t s t u r n e d to the Soviets, ally. d e s p i t e everything, L o o k i n g into the night sky, real who had become I decided that now was the time for my n a t i o n to r e a c h for a new destiny. I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s had c r e a t e d a false p i c t u r e . C o n t r a r y to p o p u l a r conception, w e r e not inept. people--not they w e r e not i n v i n c i b l e a n d we I had to win back h o n o r and p r e s t i g e for m y only in Egypt but t h r o u g h o u t the A r a b world. w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y to inflict losses on Israel. 232 It The m y t h that they w e r e u n b e a t a b l e had grown, but I k n e w the reality: Israel is a s m a l l country, little able to suffer a s i g n i f i c a n t loss of soldiers, and equipment. property, I n e e d e d to a f f e c t the p s y c h e of the I s r a e l i s to m a k e t h e m u n d e r s t a n d that t e r r i t o r y a l o n e p r o v i d e s no real security. T h e 1972 s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e b e t w e e n N i x o n and B r e z h n e v had r e i n f o r c e d the s u p e r p o w e r e m p h a s i s on detente. The p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t for us was a d r a m a t i c r e d u c t i o n in S o v i e t support. same time, At the A m e r i c a n b a c k i n g of Israel was as s t r o n g as ever. My c o u n t r y h a d b e e n r e d u c e d to a m e a n i n g l e s s p a w n in the b a l a n c e of p o w e r game. The status quo was a c c e p t a b l e to Israel and now a p p a r e n t l y also to the Soviets and Americans, but it was c l e a r l y i n t o l e r a b l e for us. I k n e w the U n i t e d States had the c a p a c i t y to be an e f f e c t i v e mediator it was in the M i d d l e East, in t h e i r but I had to c o n v i n c e the A m e r i c a n s i n t e r e s t to do so. At the time, the A m e r i c a n s had c h o s e n to d e - e m p h a s i z e our area; they w e r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h such matters as Vietnam, detente, the o p e n i n g w i t h China, Watergate debacle. intervene a g a i n s t Israel to b r i n g about a fair r e s o l u t i o n dispute. P a r t of the reason, and the The U n i t e d States was not w i l l i n g to no doubt, of our was b e c a u s e t h e y v i e w e d m y n a t i o n as a p a r t n e r of the S o v i e t s - - a n a t i o n not to be helped. For years, the Soviets had shown a p p r e c i a t i o n 233 for our friendship by p r o v i d i n g helpful with military their substantial equipment s u p p o r t had d e g e n e r a t e d that was unacceptable. c e r t a i n weapons, the w e a p o n s aid. They w e r e e s p e c i a l l y and training. to a h a l f - h e a r t e d however, responsiveness Even when they p r o m i s e d deliveries were incessantly that were By 1972, to p r o v i d e delayed. M a n y of finally shipped were not the ones we needed. Ultimately, in the s o v i e t my disgust boiled over. ambassador In July and told him p l a i n l y that accept his n a t i o n ' s arrogant manner provided a deadline of one week for the 15,000 advisors to depart my country. aircraft and e q u i p m e n t when they left, us. to I Soviet m i l i t a r y or they could sell t h e m to taking most of their m i l i t a r y as they withdrew. p o p u l a r w i t h my countrymen, in Egypt. already markedly return I refused of d e a l i n g w i t h us. The Soviet d e p a r t u r e worked to our benefit. praised I called They could either take t h e i r The Soviets met my deadline, equipment 1972, and my expulsion Of course, diminished, They w e r e not order was w i d e l y the level of Soviet s u p p o r t h a d and I foresaw no l i k e l i h o o d to the days of bountiful aid in any event. of a The p e r c e p t i o n that the Soviet d e p a r t u r e meant we would not launch a m i l i t a r y offensive was also important. In reality, we could not h a v e initiated an a s s a u l t while the Soviet advisors country. I needed remained in freedom of action to face the Israelis 234 without the limitations decisions about consultation fall to of to personal Council I moved reassurance of t h e I learned to a c t u a l even the war minister convey my plans reason for t h e d u p l i c i t y to war. attitude. As had to t h e p r o p e r I replaced Quickly, than and the new minister my plans f o r an offensive war. military power my goals. Preparing improve been Her our carved prospects nature lands had cowardly our p o s i t i o n been attack shown diplomatic 235 had with of m y mind, to real afraid to go the proper we h a d Second on sufficient needed Israel World and then Other even the military I also in 1957 in 1967. and to o f f e r for the virtual who our For my His of n a t i o n s . the that failed he was satisfied following my war Supreme back He h a d w a s n o t enough. in t h e c o m m u n i t y o u t of A r a b by her understand the military standing aggressive clearly to a c h i e v e I was the for By t h e requested. to act: worked needed. back commanders! a war minister was directing in t h e lied to me. a n d no Israel. I convened I feared failure him with against I had military The al-Assad He s o o n r e p o r t e d faster forces. Hafez war planning, of our r e a d i n e s s , armed country with attack imposed. for m e to m a k e other an a g r e e m e n t o u t the battle. be r e a d y were f r o m any in a c o o r d i n a t e d flesh would involvement security or a p p r o v a l to s e c u r e us 1972, minister forces able join superpower my nation's with I was Syria direct to had War. most nations began support. I could see isolation of Israel. to the As a block, the t h i r d w o r l d c o u n t r i e s d e n o u n c e d the c o n t i n u i n g o c c u p a t i o n of A r a b lands. M o s t of the A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e p o i s e d to o f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t d i p l o m a t i c support. disputes Israeli a m o n g the A r a b states also calmed, The t r a d i t i o n a l as all s h a r e d the g o a l of r e t a k i n g the lands Israel had seized in 1967. I believed we w o u l d be able to take a d v a n t a g e of l o n g - h e l d p l a n s to use oil as a w e a p o n a g a i n s t Israel. The e c o n o m i c tool was an i m p o r t a n t a d j u n c t to m y m i l i t a r y plans. The seeds for d i p l o m a t i c planted. i n i t i a t i v e s on m a n y f r o n t s had been The c o a l i t i o n of support was u n p r e c e d e n t e d , it w a s fragile. but I k n e w I w o u l d have to m o v e q u i c k l y to t a k e p r o p e r a d v a n t a g e of the m a n y f a v o r a b l e factors that w e r e c o a l e s c i n g . M y u l t i m a t e goal was to r e g a i n the o c c u p i e d lands. The issue w a s how to b r i n g the p r e s s u r e on Israel to a c h i e v e our objectives. Our b a c k r o o m efforts to r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the I s r a e l i s m a d e it clear they v i e w e d us w i t h contempt; they b e l i e v e d we had n e i t h e r the will nor the p o w e r to d e f e a t them. T h e y saw no r e a s o n to n e g o t i a t e a fair agreement. d r a m a t i c m o v e on our part, the S i n a i issue. Without a Israeli l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d not r e s o l v e I s t u d i e d the s i t u a t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y and r e a l i z e d t h a t e v e n the m o s t intense d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s w o u l d be fruitless. I d e c i d e d to embrace Clausewitz: the p o l i t i c a l m e a n s of w a r w o u l d be u s e d to a c h i e v e my p s y c h o l o g i c a l and d i p l o m a t i c objectives. 236 W h a t w e r e the risks of war? A n o t h e r m i l i t a r y d e f e a t by Israel w o u l d m e a n the end for me. survive; my physical Politically, I c o u l d not safety w o u l d also be at g r a v e risk. An I s r a e l i v i c t o r y c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y open the d o o r for a L i b y a n m i l i t a r y v e n t u r e a g a i n s t my people. D e s p i t e all this, I was a b s o l u t e l y c o n v i n c e d that war was the r i g h t choice. I n e e d e d to a c h i e v e at least initial m i l i t a r y if the I s r a e l i s d r o v e us back, d i p l o m a t i c victory. success. Even I could f o r e s e e an e v e n t u a l S u r p r i s e was essential. I m a d e a n u m b e r of m o v e s to c a u s e Israel to d i s c o u n t as a bluff my final preparations for war. The removal of the S o v i e t a d v i s o r s h a d a l r e a d y b o l s t e r e d the Israeli belief t h a t we w o u l d not fight. whispers to a E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a t about "secret plans" United Nations in O c t o b e r were, as expected, My to v i s i t the dutifully conveyed to the Israelis. The I s r a e l i s simply did not b e l i e v e military T h e y t h o u g h t my a g g r e s s i v e s p e e c h e s w e r e e m p t y option. rhetoric. I had a T h e y a s s u m e d I was m e r e l y p l a y i n g out a war of words. In b o t h M a y and A u g u s t 1973, we e n g a g e d in l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s t h a t c a u s e d the I s r a e l i s to r e s p o n d w i t h full mobilizations. W h e n we launched our O c t o b e r attack, Israel had s e e n all the s i g n a l s but d e c i d e d to save the costs of a n o t h e r mobilization. T h e p a t h was thus p a v e d for our o p e n i n g s u c c e s s e s and on the land. F o l l o w i n g our early v i c t o r i o u s 237 in the air battles, the A m e r i c a n s p r o v i d e d m a s s i v e aid to Israel, prepare a counter-offensive. and t h e y w e r e a b l e to W h e n the c e a s e - f i r e came, however, we h a d t a k e n back a p o r t i o n of our Sinai that h a d b e e n c a p t u r e d in 1967. Our m i l i t a r y efforts b r o u g h t about the i m m e d i a t e r e s t o r a t i o n of A r a b pride. military. We d e s t r o y e d the m y t h of an i n v i n c i b l e Israeli I s r a e l began to r e a l i z e that the t e m p o r a r y p o s s e s s i o n of our lands did not provide an eternal i n s u r a n c e policy. S u p p o r t by my c o u n t r y m e n and also from our friends in t h e r e g i o n and a r o u n d the w o r l d h e l p e d us to m e e t our goals. The oil e m b a r g o was t a k i n g effect, us r e a c h our objectives. and it c l e a r l y added p r e s s u r e to h e l p Of c r i t i c a l importance, our v i c t o r y g a v e me the p o w e r to later p u r s u e p e a c e w i t h Israel d e s p i t e protests f r o m our A r a b friends. had s u c c e s s f u l l y It was my people, fought the Israelis. a f t e r all, who We had e a r n e d the r i g h t to c o m p l e t e our m i l i t a r y t r i u m p h w i t h a f a v o r a b l e p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t . T h e O c t o b e r War m e a n t the s u p e r p o w e r s w o u l d once a g a i n engage in the area. Their involvement in the war r e i n f o r c e d the image of the M i d d l e East as a powder keg that could p r o v o k e a S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n confrontation. The v a r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s - - i n c l u d i n g the oil e m b a r g o - - c a u s e d the U n i t e d to m o v e from its reflexive, prospects blind support of Israel. States I saw real for the U n i t e d States to m e d i a t e the p e a c e p r o c e s s f o r c e I s r a e l to bargain. 238 and In 1967, initiative Israel showed the great v a l u e of s e i z i n g the and u t i l i z i n g the i n s t r u m e n t s of s u r p r i s e and deception. We did the same in the O c t o b e r W a r - - a n d v i c t o r y resulted. We c l e a r l y understood, great our m i l i t a r y success, the end in itself. however, war was m e r e l y an i n s t r u m e n t and not A f t e r I saw we had r e a c h e d our o b j e c t i v e s , l i m i t e d the s u f f e r i n g and casualties. later d i p l o m a t i c t h a t no m a t t e r h o w we That also h e l p e d us in efforts. A n a t i o n c a n n o t b a r g a i n w h e n its o p p o n e n t does not b e l i e v e it has the p o w e r to e s c a l a t e the stakes its will. Paradoxically, if n e c e s s a r y to e n f o r c e I w e n t to war to m a k e peace: until Israel p e r c e i v e d we had s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h to pose a real threat, no p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of our c o n f l i c t was p o s s i b l e . The c o m p l e x i t y of my story should not o b s c u r e s o m e s i m p l e truths. A leader m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on a limited o b j e c t i v e and t h e n use all a v a i l a b l e m e a n s to a c h i e v e it. guaranteed, but once a good p l a n is chosen, l o n g - t e r m goal can lead to failure. No s t r a t e g y can be diversions In the end, f r o m the I had u s e d virtually all the tools of s t a t e c r a f t situation I had p o n d e r e d that starry night may h a v e s e e m e d hopeless. I saw it as an opportunity. and t h e g r a c e of Allah, we succeeded. v a l i d a t e d my strategy. 239 in p u r s u i t of my plan. W i t h some g o o d f o r t u n e The u l t i m a t e r e s u l t The